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- From f672277509705c4034bc92a141eefee4524d15aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
- From: Tobias Ronge <tobiasr@axis.com>
- Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 10:12:27 +0100
- Subject: [PATCH] gstrtspconnection: Security loophole making heap overflow
- The former code allowed an attacker to create a heap overflow by
- sending a longer than allowed session id in a response and including a
- semicolon to change the maximum length. With this change, the parser
- will never go beyond 512 bytes.
- Upstream-Status: Backport
- CVE: CVE-2019-9928
- Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
- ---
- gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
- diff --git a/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c b/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c
- index a6755bedd..c0429064a 100644
- --- a/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c
- +++ b/gst-libs/gst/rtsp/gstrtspconnection.c
- @@ -2461,7 +2461,7 @@ build_next (GstRTSPBuilder * builder, GstRTSPMessage * message,
- maxlen = sizeof (conn->session_id) - 1;
- /* the sessionid can have attributes marked with ;
- * Make sure we strip them */
- - for (i = 0; session_id[i] != '\0'; i++) {
- + for (i = 0; i < maxlen && session_id[i] != '\0'; i++) {
- if (session_id[i] == ';') {
- maxlen = i;
- /* parse timeout */
- --
- 2.21.0
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